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“Canada’s Roll of Honour”
Controversy over Casualty Notification and Publication
during the Second World War
Timothy Balzer

D

uring the present Afghanistan
mission, the reporting of
casualties receives more media
attention than any other aspect of
Canadian operations. Usually within
a day, the life story of each fatality
appears in the media, followed by
footage of the ramp ceremony and
reports from the hometown funeral.
Politicians debated whether to lower
the national flag on the Peace Tower
after every fatality. None of this could
have occurred during the Second
World War due to limitations in
communications, administration
and the sheer number of casualties.
Processing each casualty report
overseas, dispatching it to Ottawa
and then to the next-of-kin, while
allowing sufficient time before
publication in the press, took days
and often weeks. The Canadian
Army sometimes suffered more
casualties in a single day of battle
than its entire losses in Afghanistan.
Nor are there the same levels of
security concerns since limited losses
do not allow the Taliban to use
casualty reports to estimate combat
effectiveness of Canadian units.
Obviously, in 1939-1945 there could
not be today’s level of discussion
about individual casualties in the
national media, nor the capability
of transmitting the news as quickly.
Nonetheless, casualty reporting
constituted an important element of

Abstract: During the Second
World War, the Canadian Army’s
announcement of casualties to nextof-kin and the press often caused
controversy. Even though the army
tried to notify family and public as
quickly as possible, it could not always
do so. Unofficial communications with
the family, procedural failures, and
more frequently press and censorship
errors, caused occasional mistakes
in casualty reporting. Moreover, the
interests of Canada’s allies often
prevented the timely publication of
casualty names and figures, as in the
aftermath of the Dieppe Raid, Sicily
campaign and Normandy landings.
These delays were often for alleged
security reasons, sometimes with
questionable justification. This led
to widespread, albeit inaccurate,
suspicion of political manipulation
of this process by the Canadian Army
and federal government.

the army’s handling of operational
news. This article examines the
machinery and politics behind the
notification of next-of-kin and the
publication of casualty names and
numbers in the news media. Even
though the army generally wished
to notify the family, members and
public as quickly and accurately as
possible, it could not always do so.
Unofficial communications with
the family, procedural failures, and
more frequently press and censorship
errors, caused occasional mistakes
in casualty reporting. Moreover, the
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interests and regulations of Canada’s
senior allies often prevented the
timely publication of casualty
names and figures usually on the
grounds of security, sometimes with
questionable justification, frequently
resulting in conflict.
The administration of army
casualty reporting went through
numerous small refinements during
the war, but the basic structure
and procedure remained relatively
constant. Canadian Military
Headquarters (CMHQ) in London
served as the overseas records office
and conduit for transmitting casualty
reports to Ottawa. Initially, the
administrative procedure for each
casualty report was painstaking; an
individual casualty card had to be
processed, double-checked with the
unit and against existing casualty
records files, before transmission
to the records office at National
Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). 1
As the army grew in size and some
Canadian formations deployed to the
Mediterranean and later to France,
CMHQ could no longer confirm
each casualty with his unit. Instead,
the Second Echelon, the support and
administrative units of the army,
received the information in the
theatre from units and hospitals and
forwarded it to CMHQ. Once the
cable arrived at the Directorate of
Records in Ottawa, the information
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was again processed and a telegram
of notification sent to the next-ofkin. The name was added to the
publication list only after confirmation
of the notification’s receipt. This took
time: according to a March 1944 army
press release, “a casualty notice can
hardly be expected to reach Canada
in less than a week or ten days.”2 Two
of the major objectives of this system
were preventing mistaken reports
and ensuring the next-of-kin did not
have the shock of learning about the
death of a family member from a
media report.
Despite these painstaking
precautions, mistakes happened. In
some cases, the responsibility for error
lay with the army itself. During the
aftermath of the bloody Dieppe raid in
August 1942, many mistakes resulted
from waiving normal procedures
to speed through the enormous
number of casualties clogging up
the untried system. To speed the
process, Second Echelon telephoned
casualties to Records “before they
had been able to do a proper check.”3
The initial information was based on
inaccurate pre-embarkation lists and
sometimes on anecdotal information
collected at the check posts as the
men returned from the raid, which
resulted in reports of death based on
“hearsay evidence” alone.4 No formal
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courts of inquiry were held until
nine or ten days later. Conducted
by the individual units, with sworn
eyewitness evidence, they provided
reliable answers about many
casualties.5 Unfortunately, numerous
cables were despatched prior to this.
The records office deliberately cabled
the names to Ottawa, even though
they were aware that the status of
some casualties would change. It
was more important, in the light of
the pressure from NDHQ, to get the
names out quickly, with some errors,
than to delay their transmission and
ensure accuracy. This did not prevent
NDHQ from later complaining about
changes in the status of casualties that
grieved the next-of-kin.6
This departure from normal
procedure resulted in the categories
of some casualties changing two or
even three times. The exact numbers
of changes were described “as a
small percentage” of the casualties,
but they may have been as high as 14
percent.7 These changes in category
doubtless led to unnecessary grief in
many Canadian homes. For example,
Mrs. R.W. Barton of Toronto was
told her son was missing, the next
day he was reported as safe, but
several days later he returned to
missing status.8 The rush to get the
casualties to next-of-kin doubtless

Casualty notification during the
Canadian mission to Afghanistan is
considerably quicker, and more public,
than the official system in place during
the Second World War.

was beneficial to those who received
correct information, but it caused
immense uncertainty for those who
received inaccurate cables.
Nor was Dieppe the only time that
the army made mistakes in casualty
reporting. Serious delays in next-ofkin notification took place during the
Sicilian campaign in July and August
1943. In July 1943, the casualty
notification telegrams experienced
“lengthy delays” because they
competed with operational traffic
that took first priority. Although
Second Echelon received its own
equipment allowing communication
with London, it still could not use
it on 24 July because Eisenhower’s
Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ)
had not yet assigned it a radio
frequency.9 Because of the delayed
casualty reports, the instances of
next-of-kin learning of casualties by
other channels increased and resulted
in some anger in the press, which will
be discussed below.
Another embarrassing situation
arose on 30 December 1943, at the
Army Directorate of Records at
NDHQ, when a typist, processing
four casualties, mistakenly entered
“killed” in the place of “wounded”
on the duplicator stencil. The correct
status already appeared on an earlier
form, but another clerk changed
that form to match the incorrect
stencil. As a result, the next-of-kin
of the four men received telegrams
notifying them of the soldiers’
deaths. The error escaped detection
despite three checking points in the
procedure, including a review by
the directorate duty officer. The four
soldiers remained deceased until
resurrected by an update on the
condition of one of the wounded,
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directorate felt they should be weekly
or bi-weekly. “Discrepancies and
mistakes in reporting” also resulted
from “carelessness in the writing of
cables” and “adding inexperienced
personnel in the peak period we are
going through.”14
Thus, despite the attempts by
the army to avoid errors and delay,
circumstances and clerical mistakes
occasionally resulted in the next-ofkin receiving erroneous or belated
casualty reports. Sometimes, as in
Sicily, the army, despite its best efforts
to send casualty notification, ran into
difficulties beyond its control. At
other times, such as Dieppe and the
autumn of 1944, the sheer number of
casualties increased the likelihood
of error. The information received
in Canada always depended on
the accuracy of the report from
the front, during heavy fighting;
mistakes were inevitable because
casualty reports did not always
have priority for the staff of combat
units. In any case, the mere fact that
casualty reports involved at least four
steps before reaching the next-of-kin
increased the possibility of clerical
mistakes. While understandable
and probably inevitable, these errors

caused unnecessary grief and worry
for the families affected by them.
In addition to military blunders in
notifying next-of-kin, sometimes the
families of casualties received notice
through unofficial communications,
often from other soldiers or even
callous hoaxers. Sometimes this news
was completely false or misleading.
In April 1940, the Globe and Mail
reported that the father of a corporal
in the Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry received word of his
son’s death in Norway. Since the
Canadian Army denied rumours of
having troops in Norway, this became
front-page news. The story puzzled
officials at NDHQ, but quick inquiries
requested by Gillis Purcell of the CP
revealed the supposedly deceased
soldier still with his company in
the UK. It never surfaced whether
the parents were victims of a hoax
or some kind of administrative
mistake.15 On other occasions, cruel
deceivers telephoned the next-of-kin
of service personnel informing them
of their family member’s death. A
November 1942 RCAF press release
described this hoax as occurring
“frequently” and indicated that
there were multiple perpetrators.

CFJIC Z-8471-18

alerting the Directorate of Records
to the error, who sent the correct
information to the next-of-kin.10 A
10 January 1944 Canadian Press (CP)
story reported the outrage of one
of the families, and the Edmonton
branch of the Canadian Legion sent
a protest to NDHQ. The story, as
carried by the Ottawa Journal, came to
the notice of NDHQ and the records
office. A resulting investigation led to
changes that ensured more stringent
double-checking in the office.11 It is
no coincidence that two weeks later
a press release from NDHQ Army
Public Relations described a visit
by Minister of National Defence J.
Layton Ralston to the Casualties
Section of the Directorate of Records.
He underscored the need for accuracy
and speed to the staff and said that he
was “deeply impressed by the great
care taken by the casualty section to
guard against errors.”12
Despite the steps taken after
January 1944, a similar mistake
happened in November 1944 when
a Toronto mother, informed of the
death of her officer son, within
hours received a second telegram
explaining that the first cable was
erroneous and he had suffered only
a light wound. Unfortunately, the
records department did not correct
the inaccuracy in the publication list
for the newspapers and the error was
repeated.13 Mistakes happened more
frequently during the campaign in
Northwest Europe. A Directorate
of Records memorandum dated
10 October 1944 complained about
delays and inaccuracies in the reports
sent both by units at the front and
the hospitals. Progress reports on
“dangerously ill” and “seriously
ill” came only rarely, while the
Canadian prisoners of war led through
Dieppe by German soldiers. These men
made up the bulk of the “missing”
casualties held back from publication
for a month at British insistence.
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man as deceased, and the letter being
returned instead of sent to the dead
letter office.19
The practise of personnel writing
to next-of-kin continued after Dieppe.
A 10 October 1944 Directorate of
Records memorandum outlined
the problems caused by unofficial
notifications:

RC district Chaplains in Canada by
the Principal Chaplain (RC), almost
one week before the notification cable
was received in this office.20

A great amount of casualties, both
fatal and otherwise, are being
reported to the next-of-kin by
personal cables and mail long before
the official report is received at
this office. This not only puts this
Headquarters in an embarrassing
position but adds greatly to the
burden of answering enquiries on a
matter which has not been officially
reported to this office. A notable
example of this occurred lately when
H/Capt. Mooney, a R.C. Chaplain,
was killed in action, the news of his
death was “officially” reported to all

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 132777

Newspapers reported other occasions
and with other services and no doubt
this could have occurred with the
army as well.16
More often unofficial reports
of casualties came through wellmeaning letters from other soldiers.
After Dieppe, grieving next-ofkin received shocking news by
these unofficial channels, although
this was contrary to regulations.
While censorship of soldiers’ mail
existed, it tended to be haphazard
and many soldiers and officers
ignored the rules. 17 While those
writing casualties’ families were well
intentioned, they probably did not
resolve the uncertainty; as long as no
official word came, hope doubtless
remained. Other next-of-kin were
stunned when letters addressed
to missing personnel returned,
mistakenly stamped “deceased.”18
This was a result of two foul ups: the
unit prematurely labelling a missing

The memorandum failed to mention
the uncertainty that the next-of-kin
experienced until officially notified.
Much of the blame for the situation
addressed in the memorandum
lay with the slowness of official
communications. While a private
cable might conceivably beat military
telegraph communication back to
Canada, soldier’s mail should not
have. The writers may sometimes
have expected the recipient to possess
the news by the time the letter
arrived.
A similar situation occurred
during the Sicily campaign with
the casualty notifications hampered
by the lack of a Second Echelon
radio frequency. Additionally,
mountainous terrain, poor quality
batteries, and a lack of radio
equipment due to the loss of supply
ships meant that communications
between Canadian units proved
difficult, adding to casualty
reporting delays.21 This resulted in
the inevitable informal revelations.
The most conspicuous case, which
the Conservative Globe and Mail
attempted to turn into a government
embarrassing cause célèbre, involved
the family of Lieutenant-Colonel
Ralph Crowe of the Royal Canadian
Regiment, killed on 24 July. On 6
August several journalists asked
the family for pictures of Crowe,
explaining they wanted pictures of all
members of the regiment. The family
later learned that stories of Crowe’s
death began circulating at the local
military district headquarters that
Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Crowe (right)
and Major J.H.W. Pope of the Royal
Canadian Regiment were both killed
in Sicily. The delay in notifying Crowe’s
next-of–kin caused public controversy.
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same day. Two days later the family
received a 30 July letter from a
Canadian Public Relations officer in
London, a friend, informing them
of the news. Seeking confirmation,
the family made inquiries to
NDHQ, through the local military
district, which reported that it had
no notification. “The assured and
relieved” family received the official
telegram the next day. The Globe
and Mail quoted the remarks of an
unnamed officer, a family friend, that
the situation was “difficult to justify”
and he hoped that the publicity
would lead to “some reorganization
of the records [system] and press
releases” so “that a similar experience
not will not come to next of kin of
future casualties in this war.”22
A response by NDHQ explained
that overcrowded communications
systems resulted in casualty
notifications delays “during the
first three weeks of the Sicilian
c amp aig n ” an d “a n umb e r of
despatches failed to reach base
during that period.” NDHQ knew
of a report of Lieutenant-Colonel
Crowe’s death but it “had not been
confirmed.” 23 The Globe and Mail,
unimpressed by the explanation,
published several editorials accusing
the army of “brutal callousness,”
although perhaps not “intentional,”
since information in London on 30
July should have reached NDHQ the
next day. An even stronger critique
followed after the editors learned of
a second officer’s family informed
unofficially of his death. The editorial
accused NDHQ of “inexcusable
fumbling,” dismissing its explanation
as “a piece of deplorable casuistry”
and condemning the Ottawa HQ for
“refusal…ever to admit a mistake
or concede that it could be in error.
It is always ready with a denial,

LAC PA 169997

Communications difficulties during the
Sicilian campaign contributed to delays
in casualty reporting.
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explanation, or an excuse.” 24 The
Globe and Mail editorials showed
little understanding of the need for
accuracy in army casualty procedure.
Just because stories of someone’s
death had reached London did not
mean that next-of-kin could receive
notification. Avoiding inaccurate
reports and needless grief prevented
such reckless action. The Dieppe
raid had demonstrated the dangers
of ignoring procedure for speed.
Nor did the arrival of rumours in a
Canadian military district or even
NDHQ mean that the Directorate
of Records knew of the information.
The Globe and Mail editors seemed
more intent on building outrage to
embarrass the King government
than on understanding the situation.
Nevertheless, slow processing of
casualty reports left the army open
to such accusations.
The third type of mistake in nextof-kin notification happened when
the press, contrary to regulations,
published the names of casualties
before official word reached the

family. Slight revisions to the
regulations sometimes occurred.
The 10 October 1940 press censorship
directive stated:
Casualties in the Canadian
services should not be published
or broadcast until an official
casualty list has been released.
There are three reasons for this:
a) So that relatives may receive
their first notification through
official sources.
b) So that no information of
value to the enemy be revealed in
details of the time, place and other
circumstances of the casualty.
c) So as to thwart the possible
attempts of enemy agents to lower
morale by spreading false news of
casualties.
Occasionally it happens that the
facts of a casualty become known
in a community before an official
list has been published. In these
cases, if the above requirements
appear to have been satisfied, an
exception may be made but editors
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should consult the press censors

The news media usually observed
the directive, but in July 1942, the
Canadian censorship authorities
issued a reminder to wait for
official notification following the
premature publication of the names
of two officer cadets who drowned
in Ottawa. 26 Several months later
after the Dieppe raid, during an
interview by Fred Griffin of the
Toronto Star, Lieutenant-Colonel
Dollard Menard of the Fusiliers MontRoyal, mentioned Captain Alleyn’s
death, whose parents then learned
of this when the story appeared
in L’Evènement. 27 Considering the
number of casualties at Dieppe, that
merely one incident occurred shows
the overall cooperation of the press.
The Sicilian campaign led to
some major changes ensuring that
next-of-kin received official news
first. On 23 July 1943, the Ottawa
records office learned that the
Toronto Telegram and the Toronto
Star published different reports each
naming a wounded Canadian soldier.
The surprised families of both men
inquired to the records office, which
knew nothing about the casualties.
The same day, Lieutenant-Colonel
F.X. Jennings, the Army’s director of
public relations, while checking on
two CP despatches containing names
of wounded, discovered several other
names unknown to the Directorate of
Records. Jennings requested that the
CP hold the stories. In spite of this,
on 24 July, a CP despatch appeared
in the Montreal Gazette; a clipping of
this article in the army files has three
names underlined with a prominent
“no” written beside them. Either the
CP ignored Jenning’s earlier advice
or another dispatch arrived that
CP sent to the newspapers without
scrutiny.28 These incidents resulted
in the adjutant general consulting
the chief press censor, who sent
a new directive instructing news
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before publication.25

Lieutenant-Colonel Dollard Menard
commanded Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
during the Dieppe operation. Public
statements he made after the raid
circumvented the official channels for
casualty notification.

organizations that whenever a story
contained the name of a casualty, the
publisher should send the copy to
the censors for review. Alternatively,
the press could contact the Army
Directorate of Records directly,
which would now have an officer on
duty 24 hours a day in order to make
checking easier.29 These concessions
to the press appear to have resolved
the problem, which like that of the
unofficial notifications, resulted in
part from the slow rate in which
casualty reports reached Ottawa.
While these errors of casualty
notification were shocking for the
next-of-kin, the numbers of people
directly affected remained relatively
small. In contrast, the publication
of casualty lists and totals helped
shape the public image of the conflict,
a critical concern to the Canadian
Army. Nonetheless, as with many
other policies, those of the more senior
allies, particularly the British, limited
the Canadian Army’s options. This
occasionally led to accusations of the
Canadian government deliberately
concealing casualties to make the war

more palatable. Thus, it is necessary
to trace the development of army
procedures for the publication of
casualty lists and numbers and how
Allied policies shaped them.
Early in the war, the publication
of Canadian Army casualties
resulted in little controversy, since
casualties were relatively few. The
first two Canadian Army casualty
lists appeared on 22 June 1940.
They provided the name, nature of
casualty and the next-of-kin, but
not the name of the regiment, lest
the enemy calculate unit strength.
Instead, the name appeared with
a territorial pseudonym such as
“Central Ontario regiment” or named
the service branch such as “Royal
Canadian Artillery.” Details about the
circumstances did not appear in the
list itself, although the introductory
paragraph occasionally provided
bare information, such as the cause
of some accidental deaths. Still most
casualties resulted from sickness or
accidents, only sporadically from
German bombs or torpedoes, and
the numbers were relatively small:
484 total dead and missing to 27
November 1941. 30 The Japanese
attack on Hong Kong changed this.
The government and military
authorities responsible for
despatching two Canadian regiments
to Hong Kong never intended them to
engage in combat. Posting regiments
to colonial garrisons released British
troops to fight while ensuring that
Canadians did not, helping keep
the genie of conscription tightly
sealed in its bottle. Unlike similar
earlier missions in Newfoundland
and Jamaica, it ended with the
total loss of these units. When the
Japanese entered into hostilities
against the United States and Britain
on 7 December 1941, the Winnipeg
Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of
Canada, numbering 1,974 troops,
found themselves in a doomed
position with no chance of victory
or relief. By 23 December, after
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a brutal struggle, the garrison
surrendered.31 The army had to rely
on London for information on the
battle. Carl Vincent’s discussion of
the Hong Kong news shows that the
government handled most of the
publicity depending on scanty British
reports based on Japanese sources
and included deceptive British
claims about a planned relief of the
garrison by the HMS Prince of Wales.32
NDHQ Public Relations did release
a press circular trying to paint as
bright a picture as possible. Quoting
Mackenzie King and Ralston, it
emphasised the heroic defence and
claimed that it relieved pressure on
Bataan and Malaya, and that it was so
successful the Japanese commander

needed to offer terms rather than
demand “unconditional surrender.”
This last claim allegedly came from “a
Japanese report” indicating the lack
of intelligence available to Ottawa
about its own troops in Hong Kong.33
Given this dearth of accurate
information, news about casualties
was even more difficult to obtain.
Communications from Hong Kong
were sparse and there were few
casualty reports. Ralston announced
several Canadian casualties, two
men slightly wounded on 10
December, and a few other accounts
of individual casualties emerged.34
The first Hong Kong casualty list
appeared on 31 December with only
eleven names. The army admitted,

“There is no likelihood of further lists
for some time until the International
Committee of the Red Cross can
obtain details and send them here.”35
The casualty notification took
a very long time and led to some
frustration and accusations of
political reasons for the delay. On
3 February, Ralston responded to a
Baptist minister’s accusations that
the government was concealing the
Hong Kong casualty list until after
a February by-election. At least
one letter to the government from
a soldier’s family member made
similar charges. Ralston admitted his
limited sources of information, based
only on the estimate of a reporter
who escaped from Hong Kong and

LAC PA-114811

LAC C-49743

Top: Arrival of the Canadian brigade in Hong Kong, 16 November 1941; Bottom: A group of Canadian and British prisoners of war
captured at Hong Kong are liberated at the end of the war. Canadian casualty notifications from Hong Kong were much delayed due
the complete loss of the Hong Kong force which resulted in almost total dependence on the Japanese for information about casualties.
This led to a lengthy period of uncertainty about the individual fates of most Canadian soldiers after the battle.
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slow release of casualty figures
could lead to the “possible
public impression – probably
a wrong and dangerous one
– that the military authorities
themselves were trying to
cover up something.”42 On 12
September, W.D. Herridge,
former Prime Minister R.B.
Bennett’s brother-in-law,
complained about the delay in
a speech to the Ottawa Kiwanis
Club.43 The release of the names
of the missing on 15 September
did not stop the criticism. The
Regina Leader-Post accused
the military of a “soft pedal”
strategy to try to minimise
the impact of the casualties.44
On 26 September, the Nova
Scotia Newspaper Association
charged the government with
covering up the Dieppe losses
and demanded swifter release of
information in the future.45 Over time,
criticism of the delays faded and later
works, apart from Gillis Purcell’s
1946 thesis on Press Censorship, did
not raise the issue. Purcell, citing
Ross Munro, accused the military
of abusing censorship to delay the
casualty numbers to cushion the
blow. In 1942, however, Purcell had
written to McNaughton supporting
the policy of withholding information
from the press, even though he
claimed already knew the “inside”
story of Dieppe directly from Ross
Munro.46
The delay in publishing the list
of the missing until 15 September
seems suspicious. Until 25 August,
the newspapers published the
names of the missing along with
the other casualties, but two days
later announced a delay in reporting
them to allow those who had avoided
the Germans to escape. The notice
observed, “Any word getting through
to the enemy that they are missing is
of course a signal for a search.”47 On
4 September, the newspapers printed
the military claim that the procedure
LAC PA-145980

speculated that one third of
Canadians were dead, injured
or captured during the fighting
and the rest became prisoners
after the surrender. Ralston
refused to make any definitive
statement on casualties with
such incomplete information
but wanted to dispel rumours
placing the Canadian dead at 50
percent.36 Later that month the
government released estimates
of the total casualties based on
Japanese reports, given through
Argentina as protecting power,
of 1,689 Canadians prisoners,
inferring that the remaining 296
were dead or missing.37
The actual notifications of
the individual soldier’s fate took
over a year. On 2 September
1942, the Department of
National Defence announced
the names of 507 prisoners, based
on the receipt of prisoners’ letters
carried by the Gripsholm, a diplomatic
exchange ship, rather than by
Japanese notification. The letters were
“heavily censored” and many rejected
outright by the Japanese, and the
press release warned against drawing
conclusions about the fate of those
not mentioned.38 The first prisoner
list, based on Japanese notification,
consisted of 296 names and was
released on 16 October 1942; others
followed over the next months.39 By
December, 1,593 individuals had
been named, although not all by
official Japanese reports.40
Obtaining the complete lists
required diplomatic manoeuvring.
When the Japanese inquired about
the status of Japanese interned in
Canada, the government agreed to
cooperate, provided the Japanese
furnished all the names of Canadian
military prisoners. On 17 August,
the Department of External Affairs
reported that the POW lists were
“virtually complete.” 41 The entire
process took an excruciating year
and a half. The Hong Kong incident

The grave of 18-year-old Private Morton
Thompson of the Royal Rifles of Canada.
Stanley Cemetery, Hong Kong, October 1945.

occurred in the Pacific theatre and
the casualty reporting process, unlike
that in Europe, remained almost
totally in the hands of the Japanese,
the Red Cross, and the protecting
power. Thus, it was an extremely
atypical case for the Canadian Army
during the Second World War.
The Dieppe raid shaped
Canadian Army casualty reporting
more than any other event. As with
much else connected with the raid,
the publication of casualties became
clouded in the haze of distrust.
Someone suspecting a conspiracy
to deceive the public about Dieppe
could not help but notice the delays in
casualty reporting in the newspapers.
The slow release of the casualties
was suspicious enough, but delaying
publication of the names of the
missing, which comprised the vast
majority of the casualties, until 15
September was worse. Seemingly,
the military hoped to delay negative
public reaction or to preserve public
morale by softening the blow. Some
newspapers, however, were already
suspicious. On 3 September, the
Ottawa Journal warned that the
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There was also an appeal to alliance
unity, since British and Americans
were also missing, any publication
of the names of the missing would
jeopardize “the desired security for all
concerned.”54 How the publication of
Canadian names would compromise
the security of missing British and
Americans went unexplained.
NDHQ consented to the MoI policy
on 24 August.55 In agreement with
the British and Americans, the release
date of the names for publication was
set for 15 September.56
Was the MoI really concerned
about the escape of missing personnel?
There is some reason to suspect that

CFJIC Z-8471-16

of casualties be not …released to
press for time being.” 52 NDHQ
requested specific information about
the MoI’s concerns, explaining that
they had already sent out casualty
lists, although they had not given
the total casualties.53 On 24 August
CMHQ, after a long discussion
with the MoI, responded to NDHQ,
explaining that the concern of the
MoI was naming missing personnel.
In earlier Commando raids, some
missing soldiers had been able to
escape; therefore NDHQ should
withhold publication of the missing
for three weeks to a month, although
next-of kin could still be informed.

CFJIC PMR 86-254

was “in accordance with agreed
censorship practise of the United
Nations.”48 It seems no coincidence
that the Army Council offered this
justification on the same day as the
Ottawa Journal’s critical editorial
about the delay.49
These explanations, especially
about escape, seem very far-fetched.
Escape from Dieppe by anyone
pinned down on the beaches and
unable to get through impenetrable
defences was impossible. A few
Canadians escaped, but during
transportation away from Dieppe
after their capture. Secondly, the
Germans were unlikely to assume
that the missing had escaped because
of the nature of modern warfare and
amphibious operations. Artillery
could blow men to pieces or their
bodies float out to sea. The Germans
left the dead in place below the high
water line, hoping the tide might
wash them higher up the beach;
many bodies were likely carried out
to sea.50 The idea that the Germans
would go through the painstaking
process of comparing the names of
the missing to prisoner rolls, and
use valuable manpower to search
for them when they were probably
dead, seems farcical. In fact, almost
a year after the raid, 246 Canadians
remained missing.51
The pressure for delay originated
in the British Ministry of Information
(MoI). On 22 August, CMHQ cabled
NDHQ with a rather confused
message: “as a result of a despatch
from Adam Marshall, Montreal, to
Evening Standard here, MoI request
that names of officers and numbers
German public relations photographs of
Canadian soldiers captured at Dieppe. In
Canada the delayed release of casualty
information was linked to the need to
deny useful information to the Germans
that might help them recapture escaped
prisoners. However, the delayed release
was pushed by the British who did
not want to release specific casualty
information on any one operation.
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this concern was secondary to the
goal of forcing the Canadians into
adhering to the British policy of
not releasing the total casualties
of any action. On 8 September,
during his defence of Dieppe in
Parliament, Churchill reminded the
House “it is not the practise to give
exact figures of casualties in men
or materiel suffered in individual
operations.” 57 This policy was to
keep the enemy from being able to
deduce the effectiveness of their
tactics and the strength of British
units. The reporting of all casualties
was delayed for up to a month then
divided up for publication so it was
not apparent in which engagement
they were incurred. 58 This would
work for the British forces in combat
on several fronts but not for the
Canadians, whose only action was
the raid. To conceal the extent of
the Dieppe disaster from the British
people, the MoI had to convince
Canada to withhold the publication
of missing personnel. Still this only
delayed the revelation and Churchill
faced potentially embarrassing
questions about discrepancies in his
earlier claims about Dieppe following
Canada’s publication of the total
casualty figures. 59 This move by
British authorities was the first in a
long effort to get Canada to comply
with their casualty reporting policies.
Was the Canadian military
convinced of the necessity to protect
missing escapees, or did they simply
comply to keep the casualty total
from Canadians longer? Four factors
indicate that the army took the MoI’s
claims at face value. First, the “Roll
of Honour,” as the casualty lists were
titled, originally included both the
missing and a running total of the
casualties in the operation. This was
not the action of an organization
determined to conceal the losses.
After three days of discussing the
MoI request, the Army agreed to halt
publication. If the Canadian army
had been looking for an “easy out” on
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the casualties, it could have complied
much more quickly.
Furthermore, the army actually
believed that Canadians had escaped
from the beaches, no matter how
unlikely this might seem in hindsight.
Lieutenant-Colonel Menard,
during the “Heroes of Dieppe”
tour, mentioned that according to
information received in Britain,
large numbers of Fusiliers MontRoyal had escaped into France from
Dieppe.60 How Menard came by the
“information” is unclear, although
he may have been referring to four
soldiers who later escaped from a
German train, two of whom had
made it to Gibraltar by 7 October.61
The army quickly killed the story by
instructing cable censors to hold all
messages dealing with the remarks.62
NDHQ ordered both CMHQ and
commanders of all Canadian Home
Forces Commands to prevent Dieppe
personnel from making statements
that could compromise the escape of
Canadians at large.63 The speedy and
vehement warning to all commands
makes clear that they believed that
many of the missing were still on the
loose.
Similarly, the British Air Ministry
had requested the Royal Canadian
Air Force (RCAF) withhold the names
of their missing for five weeks to
allow downed aircrew the chance to
escape. The RCAF adopted this policy
29 July 1942. 64 The newspapers were
informed, “if only one of our men
elude the enemy it will be worth
the effort.”65 McNaughton probably
knew of the RCAF decision, if not
through official channels, because
his own son, Squadron Leader Ian
McNaughton, went missing in June
1942.66
The final indication that the
Canadian Army accepted the MoI’s
claims was its adoption of the practice
of withholding the list of the missing,
and later all casualties, for up to four
weeks as standard policy.67

In the year following the Dieppe
raid, NDHQ and the British War
Office debated the casualty issue
through CMHQ. The British insisted
that Canadians wait a month before
publishing any casualties because it
would be potentially embarrassing
if Canada published its losses earlier
in joint operations and could assist
enemy intelligence to assess the
effectiveness of tactics and remaining
unit strength.68 NDHQ felt the British
system would not work in Canada,
where there would be “violent protest
from press and public opinion”
regarding delays in publication and
“require [a] complicated procedure
open to criticism.”69 The War Office
countered, “Other Dominions have
agreed to the policy of delayed
r e l e a s e s . ” 70 Y e t w h e n N D H Q
checked through the Canadian high
commissioners with New Zealand
and Australia, it discovered that
the War Office misled them; in
most circumstances, both dominions
published casualties immediately
after notification of next-of-kin.
This deception obviously made
NDHQ less trustful of the War
Office. Because of the fear of criticism
about censorship “on grounds other
then security,” NDHQ demanded
“a definite statement” from the
War Office and Senior Canadian
Combatant in Britain, A.G.L.
McNaughton, stating that delays
in publishing casualty lists were
imperative for security reasons. 71
McNaughton and the War Office
agreed. Furthermore, the War Office
argued that because Australians and
New Zealanders served on several
fronts, the enemy gained no valuable
information. Canada’s situation,
with 1st Canadian Division about
to embark on the Sicily operation,
differed. Should Canada become
involved on several fronts, the 30-day
delay in casualty publication might
change. After months of debate,
NDHQ reluctantly decided to follow
British procedure, but reserved the
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The wounded await evacuation to a Casualty Clearing Station of the Royal
Canadian Army Medical Corps in the Normandy beachhead, France, 6 June
1944. Canadians became impatient to know the D-Day casualty numbers,
especially after the Americans announced theirs.

right to alter this policy if conditions
changed, after consulting the War
Office.72 Nonetheless, the competing
motivations behind the NDHQ and
War Office – worry over public
criticism versus security concerns –
guaranteed continued conflict.
Despite this agreement, the
disputes continued during the Sicilian
campaign. In early August, Ralston
felt pressured to announce casualty
numbers, especially after the US
Secretary of War Stimson released the
total American casualties in Sicily up
to 22 July. Canadian Adjutant General
H.F.G. Letson complained from
Ottawa, “These unilateral agreements
with Troopers [the War Office] which
are not tied with the U.S., place
Canada in the position of always
being last with the news.” Adding to
Ralston’s difficulties, the American
papers published casualty records
immediately following next-of-kin
notification.73 A Wartime Information
Board (WIB) memorandum reported
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the observations of a United Church
clergyman in St. Lambert, Quebec
that his parishioners, suspicious
at the lack of information, “read
between the lines” to speculate on
casualty numbers and complained
that Americans received more
news. Letson requested that CMHQ
arrange with the War Office for a
similar release, and would go ahead
the next day, 10 August, unless
there were objections.74 Predictably,
the War Office objected because,
although the Canadian participation
in Sicilian combat was completed,
the information might be of value
to the enemy for future operations.
Undaunted, Ottawa kept up the
pressure, and the War Office passed
on the request to AFHQ, who acceded
to Canada’s demands, although this
process delayed the announcement
until 19 August.75 This gave rise to
rumours in Canada, like that one,
repeated by an Ottawa “charwoman,”
“15,000 Canadians had already

been killed.”76 Despite this gossip
and the sometimes acrimonious
relationship with the War Office, the
Canadians stuck to their agreement
to withhold casualties for 30 days.
The first casualty lists appeared in
the newspapers on 13 August, a
month after the landings, and the
last on 16 September, over 30 days
after the final Canadian actions.77
Thus, despite some unhappiness
with British policy, the Canadian
Army adhered to the agreement and
continued to do so during the Italian
campaign. Surprisingly, when the
Canadian Army did become active
on two fronts in June 1944, the 30-day
delay continued, even though there
were grounds to challenge it.78
The 1944 Normandy campaign
resulted in further confusion about
the publication of casualty numbers.
Following the 6 June Normandy
landings, apprehensive Canadians
with memories of Dieppe awaited
news of casualty numbers, but for
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several weeks none came. Predictably,
the opposition and anti-government
newspapers pushed Ralston for the
figures. On 16 June, Conservative MP
R.B. Hanson demanded the statistics;
Ralston replied that the names would
follow after 30 days as usual, but
“security concerns” prevented
giving totals, although he planned to
communicate with Allied authorities
and release them as soon as safely
able. 79 On 17 June, General Omar
Bradley, commander of the American
army in Normandy, announced the
total American casualties to that date.
This immediately led to cries that the
Canadian government should do
likewise. A Globe and Mail editorial
said that nothing now prevented
the release except the “security”
of the government. The editorial
reminded the public of the secrecy
and delay surrounding the Dieppe
casualties, to allow the missing to
escape, a situation that no longer
existed.80 Nor did the criticism come
only from the Conservative press. A
22 July despatch from J.A.M. Cook,
war correspondent of the Liberal
Winnipeg Free Press, demonstrated
equal bitterness. He credited the
Americans for a pattern of greater
openness about casualties, while
the Canadians appeared even more
reluctant than the British did, hiding
behind secrecy to conceal their
losses. He cited the case of Ortona,
the Christmas 1943 battle, of which
the public never received precise
casualty totals.81 Cook did not realise
that in the Mediterranean, Canada
was bound by agreement with the
War Office in which the Americans
were uninvolved. Additionally, the
army never revealed the specific
casualties for any battle. Dieppe was
an exception because it was obvious in
which battle the casualties occurred;
in all other campaigns, casualty
reports never specified the individual
engagements. Cook’s article shows
that the critiques emanated not
only from political motivations, but
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also from frustration with the lack
of information allowed by military
regulations.
In response to these criticisms,
Ralston asked CMHQ if he could
provide an answer and release
Canadian casualty figures. He learned
that Bradley’s announcement of the
American casualties in Normandy
was unauthorized. The American
First Army censor incorrectly
believed Bradley had the right to
release the information because there
were no specific orders from SHAEF
or 21 Army Group prohibiting it.
Bradley’s act did not automatically
allow similar reporting of the
casualties of the Second British Army
in which the Canadians in Normandy
then served.82 Ralston believed an
acknowledgement of the mistake
necessary, but Brigadier Penhale
of CMHQ advised him,” since no
public announcement of the mistake
has been made…it would be wrong
for him to refer to it as such in the
house.”83 Although Ralston agreed
to consider Penhale’s advice, political
necessity led him to inform the
House that same day. Hanson, again
on the attack, demanded to know
why “there is to be one rule for the
American people and another for the
Canadian people.” Ralston implied
that Bradley violated an agreement
on casualty numbers by making
an unauthorized announcement,
although he did not say so directly.
The newspapers however, fully
understood and pointed the fingers
at Bradley. Ralston would wait until
an authorized casualty release to
preserve security.84
CMHQ and SHAEF reached an
understanding that future casualty
numbers would be coordinated
with the Canadian government for
simultaneous announcement.85 These
arrangements had mixed results. On
28 June, the release of the first total
went smoothly enough; CMHQ
received advance warning and
coordinated the announcement in

Canada. CMHQ completely missed
a later announcement on 5 August
because the junior staff handling
SHAEF’s message believed it routine
and did not treat it with the required
urgency. The government again
faced embarrassment because the
Americans beat them to a casualty
announcement. It is just as well
that CMHQ then arranged with
SHAEF for permission to publish
total casualty figures after 30 days
had passed, although the theatre they
occurred in would remain secret.
This became the method of casualty
announcements for the remainder of
the war.86

C

*****

anada, as a junior partner
in the alliance, experienced
many frustrations about casualty
publication. The British resorted to
manipulation to delay bad news after
Dieppe and then later lied about the
concurrence of other dominions to
their policy. Canada’s agreement to
submit to Allied policies frequently
ended with embarrassment for the
government, creating suspicions
that Ralston and the army concealed
casualty numbers to cover up
reverses. In all these situations, the
sleeping dragon of conscription for
overseas service lay underneath
much of the tension. By concealing
casualty figures, the government may
have been hiding a need for drafted
reinforcements from Canada. Yet there
is no evidence that the government
or army ever manipulated casualty
reports for political reasons. Rather,
in these debates, the Canadian Army
eventually chose cooperation with
the Allies, over political expediency,
despite the political fallout. This
guaranteed that the Canadian Army
observed the chain of command, as
its formations served under British
and Allied command. It is unusual
in Canadian military history for
domestic political concerns to take
second place to military necessity,
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but casualty reporting during the
Second World War is one such
case. In the end, poor relations
with the USA and UK would have
caused the Canadian government
greater problems than occasionally
appearing overly secretive.
The casualty reporting of the
Canadian Army during the Second
World War to the next-of-kin and the
press was not flawless. Occasional
mistakes resulted from a desire
to inform the next-of-kin as soon
as possible. Other instances, such
as clerical errors and the press
releasing names too quickly, were
regrettable but given the numbers of
casualties during the war probably
inevitable. Delays resulted from poor
communications and publication
agreements with allies. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the sinister motivations
behind errors and delays frequently
alluded to by opposition politicians
and press were fantasy. Still, these
incidents doubtless contributed
to many Canadians’ distrust of
war news. The army attempted to
inform next-of-kin and the press as
quickly and accurately as possible
within the limitations of security,
communications, and agreements
with allies. Regrettably, as the many
incidents recounted here demonstrate,
in politics the appearance of guilt can
be as damaging as its reality.
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